The Role of Affective Processes in the Side-Effect Effect

Abstract

[eng] The Side-Effect Effect (SEE) refers to the influence of moral considerations in the use of non-moral concepts such as intentionality. Research has consistently shown that people consider harmful side effects of an action more intentional than helpful side effects. There is an ongoing debate about how to explain this asymmetric pattern of judgment and the psychological factors involved in it. A prominent explanation, known as the motivational bias account, posits a possible role of affective processes in intentionality attributions. According to this view, affective reactions could trigger a motivation to blame agents that bring about harmful side effects, which acts expansively on intentionality attributions. We call this the affective bias hypothesis (ABH). Evidence for the ABH is mixed, with some findings suggesting a role for affective processes, while others suggesting that affective processes play no role in the SEE. A possible explanation for these apparently contradictory results points to affective processes involved in the SEE being confined to anger. In a series of empirical studies, we systematically measured and manipulated participants’ anger in order to test the ABH. Together with the existing empirical literature, our findings suggest that affective processes play no role in intentionality judgments in SEE cases, while providing support for a non-emotional motivation to blame as a factor underlying the SEE.