Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining

dc.contributor.author	Cardona, D.
dc.contributor.author	Rubí-Barceló, A.
dc.date.accessioned	2021-09-28T06:23:49Z
dc.date.available	2021-09-28T06:23:49Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11201/155730
dc.description.abstract	[eng] We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of equilibria. When such an agent is sufficiently more patient than the rest, there is an equilibrium in which her group-mates make the same proposal as the members of the other group. Thus, in heterogeneous groups the presence of more patient members may reduce the utility of its members.
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.relation.isformatof	https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020012
dc.relation.ispartof	Games, 2016, vol. 7, num. 2, p. 1-17
dc.rights	, 2016
dc.subject.classification	33 - Economia
dc.subject.other	33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title	Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.date.updated	2021-09-28T06:23:49Z
dc.subject.keywords	Multilateral bargaining
dc.subject.keywords	one-dimensional choices
dc.subject.keywords	Multiple equilibria
dc.subject.keywords	Time preference
dc.rights.accessRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020012