Imperfect certification in a Bertrand duopoly

Lucie Bottega; Jenny De Freitas

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dc.contributor.author	Lucie Bottega
dc.contributor.author	Jenny De Freitas
dc.date.accessioned	2025-01-30T12:14:09Z
dc.date.available	2025-01-30T12:14:09Z
dc.identifier.citation	Bottega, L., i De Freitas, J. (2019). Imperfect certification in a Bertrand duopoly. Economics Letters, 178, 33-36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.014
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11201/168305
dc.description.abstract	[eng] A label that imperfectly signals product quality is analyzed in a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Considering strategic firms when certification is imperfect has some important implications. A separating equilibrium can be sustained with a free test due to price strategic complementarity. When the certifier's objective is welfare, and the test cost is sufficiently small, the most appropriate test is that which is subject to a low rate of false negatives.
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.publisher	Elsevier
dc.relation.ispartof	Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 178, p. 33-36
dc.rights	all rights reserved
dc.subject.classification	33 - Economia
dc.subject.other	33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title	Imperfect certification in a Bertrand duopoly
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.type	Article
dc.date.updated	2025-01-30T12:14:09Z
dc.subject.keywords	Asymmetric information
dc.subject.keywords	Separating equilibrium
dc.subject.keywords	Imperfect test
dc.subject.keywords	Quality certification
dc.subject.keywords	Labeling
dc.rights.accessRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.014