What deep disagreements are and are not: A meta-epistemological analysis [preprint]

Abstract

[eng] This paper critically examines how deep disagreements should be conceptualised. Initially, we examine critically the most prominent definitions and theories of deep disagreements and assess their capacity to capture the phenomenon. It is argued that, although existing accounts provide valuable insights that further our understanding of deep disagreements, they are imprecise for various reasons. Subsequently, we contend that these imprecisions motivate the need for a more exhaustive meta-epistemological reflection regarding how epistemologists should go about defining and/or theorising about deep disagreements. We end the paper by briefly outlining the options available. We can either continue to defend a given account of deep disagreement and adapt it to address the criticism or argue that “deep disagreement” does not represent an epistemologically interesting class or phenomenon. A third option is to defend a pluralistic conception of deep disagreements. What option is to be favoured requires further investigation.